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Abstract
Digitalization, real-time data, autonomous operation and ICT are all
available to aid energy system integration, to provide more robust, reli-
able and on demand services to consumers and to enable producers a more
flexible supply, utilizing various resources. However, with such tight inte-
gration the risks of systems failure is becoming even greater, specifically
cyber threats against the energy systems. Newcastle University organ-
ised in April 2017 the First International Cyber Security Workshop in
Smart Energy Systems gathering experts from academic institutions and
industrial partners, from around the world, to discuss the current security
risks to the smart energy systems, the current approaches and the possible
future solutions. This document reports on the findings of this workshop.
1 Introduction
Globally, the energy systems are going through a rapid transition period
of adapting renewable resources and information communication technolo-
gies (ICT) solutions into their current operations [1, 2, 3, 4]. Renewable
energies help in reducing carbon footprints, cope with the increasing en-
ergy demands and ICT enables the energy systems to become more effi-
cient, responsive and autonomous.
The role of ICT sector for the energy sector is becoming more promi-
nent, vital and necessary for the sector operation. The transitions of
energy sectors into smart grids has opened new opportunities to the en-
ergy providers to become more resilient, robust and cost effective. For the
consumers, smart grids provide them with the ability to manage their en-
ergy consumption based on the time of usage and suggested time slots by
their provider and in return consumers enjoy the remuneration schemes
provided by the utility operators.
The rapid adaptation of ICT has also unveiled some of the unfore-
seen and critical risks that are associated with it that could potentially
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jeopardize the entire operations of the smart energy systems (SES). The
concept of connectivity and surveillance in all layers of the SES and the
underlying networks at all times, with having access to the real-time data
exchanged between the layers, is fundamental to the SES to operate in an
efficient and effective manner. However, with a great degree of connec-
tivity the risks of system failures resulting in triggering cascading failures
are increasing [5]. This is when cyber domain is becoming very important
to protect and defend to avoid, prevent and minimize any such failures
that are caused by cyber domain.
In addition to the natural disasters and physical and mechanical fail-
ures, cyber security is another topic that has been of a great interest.
The energy assets are among the most important and vital points to pro-
tect and defend in warfare, espionage and cyber-attack [USA-CIS]. The
availability of the energy sector is so vital in all levels of the society that
contemplating and facing a cyber-attack on any level of the energy systems
could have catastrophic implications on both safety of the individuals and
also to the operations of the dependent systems [6]. One of most recent
cyber attack incident on the energy systems occured on December 2015
in Ukrain where over 25 local substations were affected and resulted in
power outages with approximately 220,000 costumers affected [7].
In general, the energy providers are familiar, well prepared and re-
silient for sudden mechanical failures or physical disturbance to their as-
sets that affect segment of their systems only. With the cyber-threats,
utility providers are not so resilient against it. For instance in the power
sector, if the cyber attack is happing in a large scale where the reserve ca-
pacity is not enough to compensate the service disruptions, operations [8].
This is why, cyber security solutions in the energy systems can not
be based on a single task solutions but instead it should be a collection
of solutions that bridges between the various systems that also provide
insight and measure failure implication in all systems involved.
This report is prepared based on the insight, challenges and advise pro-
vided in the cyber security workshop NCl by a panel of experts from both
industry and academia.
The remaining of this report is organized as follow, section 2 is providing
and overview of current challenges, section 3 is about what the possible
solutions could be. Section 4 focuses on the workshop held in Newcas-
tle with the summary of the report followed in section 5. The appendix
has three sections consisting of list of participants as A followed by the
workshop agenda as B and the summary of the workshop as C.
2 Current challenges identified
Within the energy system engineers, industries, policy makers and reg-
ulators the importance of protecting the energy systems against cyber
attacks and cyber failures is widely accepted. Nowadays, security in the
energy systems refers to both its original definition on ensuring the secu-
rity of supply and protecting it against cyber failures and cyber attacks.
The energy systems are very resilient against physical and non-cyber re-
lated failures that can withstand huge interruptions which are not visible
to the energy consumers[10]. However, the digital and cyber failures are
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Figure 1: Smart energy systems (SES) domains and sub-systems [9]
relatively a new domain that could lead to cascading failures with a catas-
trophic impact on both the energy providers and the energy consumers.
To this point, there are various challenges both in terms of providing
technical solutions that protect the systems against the cyber attack and
also the socio-technical aspect of it that includes the consumer as part of
the solution. This is the reason the cyber security in the energy sector
attract a diverse solutions from power engineers, cyber security experts,
energy providers, energy market operators, social scientist, policy makers
and solution providers.
2.1 Types of cyber attack in the energy sector
Energy systems are heterogeneous, complex, multi layered, interconnected,
highly coupled and are dependent on various external factors to oper-
ate and therefore the threats vary in type, target and implications. The
threats range from power system control command, market price infor-
mation, consumer’s meter data manipulations to the monitoring soft-
ware [11].
In addition a variety of communication networks are interconnected
with the energy systems to provide sensing, monitoring and control. These
communications networks are associate with the supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems to manage the real time energy system
and provide real-time control. It is not surprising that such systems can
be targeted from various technological points of views. Some commonly
threats known in the energy sector are, communication interception and
network analysis, traffic modification and fault injection, authorization
violation, spoofing of the utility systems and denial of the services by re-
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source exhaustion and signal jamming [12] which are the indication to the
extent that needs to be protected.
2.2 Risk Awareness and communication technolo-
gies
SCADA systems have been providing the monitoring and control mech-
anism to the energy sector and have enabled the operators to be more
efficient and responsive to the system changes. Nonetheless, SCADA sys-
tems were designed to operate on the private network and to be totally
isolated from the Internet. However, the shift in the energy sector to
become technologically smarter and to become even more dependent on
real-time data to enable demand and response management , means that
SCADA systems also need to be integrated with the new technologies and
in some point operate outside their private network. In addition, security
has not been part of the initial design of early SCADA systems, meaning
that they lack encryptions and authentications. Although, some of the
newer types of SCADA systems such as remote terminal units (RTUs) are
Internet enabled and provide some layer of security but the deployment of
these advanced RTUs in the field is very limited due to the huge financial
implication on the operators[13].
Monitoring and control in the energy sector is not a new task to the
operators, in contrast it has been very well researched and investigated
[14]. However, the resolution and depth of the monitoring and control has
been relatively based of the transmission layer of the power systems with
very limited ICT capabilities in the distribution layer. The visibility of
the distribution network is very limited as not all the substation are ICT
enabled (only up 11KV) and this limits the ability to control and monitor
such assets remotely. In addition in terms of numbers, these asset consti-
tute most of the nodes in the energy sector that can not be controlled or
monitored remotely.
The emergence of smart grid in the power grid infrastructure with the
objective to provide efficiency, reliability and safety based on available
real-time data of the utility providers and consumers, has highlighted the
importance of risk awareness and risk assessment tools in the energy sec-
tors. With the modern smart grid systems, the risk assessments are no
longer only limited to physical and mechanical failures but they also in-
clude the cyber failures and cyber attack implications on the system. For
the utilities and solution providers the challenge is the ability to distin-
guish between possible stealthy cyber-attacks and more traditional fail-
ures[cite the workshop]. The ability to determine the cause is important
because it paves the way for the next move to how to prepare and provide
a response to such incidents while the risk levels are explained and visu-
alized in a form understandable by system operator while still delivering
the service to the consumers.
2.3 Cyber-security concerns in communication In-
frastructure of Smart energy systems
Smart Energy systems contains a number of communication infrastrtruc-
ture such as Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), Advanced
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Metering Infrastructure (AMI), and Customer energy Management sys-
tem (CEMS). Each of these communication infrastructures are vulnerable
to cyber-attack from different perspectives.
In an electrical distribution grid, the SCADA (Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition) system that provides the communication infras-
tructure across the electrical grid from 11 kV to 132 kV is used as the
intelligent monitoring system in place. SCADA systems are vulnerable to
cyber-attacks due to: lack of active network monitoring and traffic mon-
itoring, insufficient reporting capabilities of some connected devices, and
Weak authentication scheme.
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) enables communication be-
tween energy consumers (customers) and the utility. AMI systems are
vulnerable to attacks mainly due to lack of coordinated security policies
and technologies amongst various components of the system.
Customer Energy Management System (CEMS) is an application ser-
vice or device that communicates with devices in the customer home. It
may have interfaces to the smart meter to read usage data or to the oper-
ations domain to get pricing or other information to make automated or
manual decisions to control energy consumption more anciently. CEMS
systems are vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to use of public communica-
tion systems, such as internet. Additionally, customer privacy is major
drawbacks of such systems.
3 Possible solutions
In the available literature different types of solutions are suggested that
tackle specific problems. Based on what is out there in can be infered
that most of single solutions can only solve one problem or one type of
attacks. Since there are variety of attacks that can be performed on the
energy systems, solutions need to be combined and in some cased used in
parallel with other techniques to gain the full advantages. The following
are some of the possible solutions that can be adapted.
3.1 Specific security solutions
As mentioned earlier, the energy sector by nature is complex, intercon-
nected, interdependent and heterogeneous. Therefore modeling such sec-
tor that includes all the layers with a detail representation of the networks,
functionality and operation is a daunting task. This is why when mod-
eling such system have been attempted, most focus has been to include
few elements in the model and study the risk, behavior and failure im-
plications in an abstract level. Or if the model includes the information
communication technology (ICT) the models also include the availabil-
ity of telecommunication as an element in the model with an abstract
representation of the system. Though such models provide a very good
insight to the operators in how to react to specific changes [15], recovering
strategies [16, 17] or how to optimize the resource [18, 19] the operation
for a specific conditions, the models lack the comprehensive visibility of
the sector. And it is very important, for instance to be able to foresee the
implication and ability to measure the consequences of a cyber attack in
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case of a cyber attack on the energy system.
3.2 Co-modelling
Since modeling every possible outcome is almost impossible to envisage,
one solution and strategy could be by utilizing co-modeling where you can
have both the physical representation models, network and hierarchy and
topology models along with cyber models .
In this case, co-modeling could refer to a various kinds of models that
are modeled discretely but all run parallel to provide advise or help in
mitigating the implications. The following are some examples to what
the discrete models cold be;
1. Physical representation of the energy sector that include the net-
work topology and power system analysis that reflect the physical
property of the power systems,
2. The ICT integrations that includes the SCADA and telecommuni-
cation,
3. The real-time analysis of data generated from 1 and 2 for the ongoing
operation of the system,
4. Threat models that include various types of attack vectors that can
be tested on 1,2 or 3,
5. Risk assessment model that measures the implication of 4 on the
operation of model 1
Though these are not an exhaustive list but rather some indications and
directions to follow. The co-modeling idea is to models heterogeneous
behaviour and combine them together, run some scenarios that fit all the
individual models in order to provide a comprehensive solution .
3.3 Security response mechanisms
The cyber vulnerabilities within the smart energy sector are mainly based
on two types; cyber vulnerabilities in the smart energy systems and cyber
physical attacks on the smart energy sector [14]. The first refers to vul-
nerabilities that includes users as part of the system as well as protecting
and enhancing the mitigation approaches. One suggestion by [14] is to
educate the energy users about the risks of the smart energy sector so
they become part of the solution rather than the weak link in the system.
Since the types of attacks on the smart energy sectors varies there-
fore the solution and protective mechanism should also reflect that and in
this manner the response can be specific and to be built to fit the purpose.
There is a need for dedicated response mechanisms that can be trig-
gered when an attack is detected, taking into account cyber and physical
impacts. In the electricity market, [20] has already identified some of the
main issues in this areas and provides a foundation for the future research
in how to minimize the attack implications.
One method of protection against targeted attacks in the energy sys-
tem that attempt to mitigate the the implications is using the blockchain
technology. Blockchain is designed to eliminate the need of a third parties
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in transactions in the middle to achieve peer-to-peer electronic payments
[21]. Although blockchain has been designed to tackle financial issues
however the idea of it is been applied in many branch of science. In the
energy systems domain [22] has proposed a blockchain based data pro-
tection that eliminates the possibility of attack implications in a various
power system layers. The framework utilizes the distributed security fea-
tures of blockchain technology to enhance the self-defensive capabilities
of the energy systems against cyber attacks.
4 Smart energy cyber-security workshop
In December 2015, a synchronized and coordinated attack compromised
three Ukrainian regional electric power distribution
companies resulting in power outages affecting around 220,000 cus-
tomer for several hours [23]. The cyber attack on the Ukrainian power
system is the first known cyber attack that has been recorded. In addition
the attack highlighted some serious flaws in the existing systems where
the attackers inside knowledge about the system could increase the level of
distractions and also sabotage the recovery procedures as it was the case
with Ukrainian cyber attack. This attack was a motivation to organize
an international cyber security workshop on 11 April 2017 hosted by the
security and power system groups at Newcastle university to gather the
views of both the industry and academic participants to aid in building
and designing the next generation cyber attack protection tools.
5 Summary & conclusion
The energy sector is the backbone of today’s living societies. There are
great efforts in digitalization of the energy systems, and in addition we are
at a period where legacy energy systems are integrated with newer and
more renewable energy systems across the globe. Digitalization (eg. smart
grid) of the energy systems enables the energy providers to become more
efficient and optimize the generations and available capacity. However,
digitalization means relying heavily on ICT technologies and integrating
it with the existing and future energy systems. Digitalization provides
numerous benefits and flexibilities to the energy systems but with some
cost attached. Apart from the operational cost, ensuring that these sys-
tems are secure and resilient against cyber attacks is very crucial. For
this reason cyber security of the energy system should become part of the
current integration. Since the energy systems are complex and diverse we
require different cyber security solutions that could fit various layers of
the energy sector. It is not feasible to come up with a single solution that
fulfills all cyber security concerns in the energy systems but instead it is
an ongoing process that should involve all of the energy producers, users
and regulators.
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C Summary of session
C.1 Risk session - workshop views
In this session the main arguments have been how to model and quantify
risks in smart energy systems. There were different points of views in
terms of what the risk is, depending on the fields of the experts in the
workshop. It was quite evident based on the discussions that there was
a general consensus around risk mitigations and what needs be done and
how to evaluate the approaches. For instance it was pointed out that
in order to capture the risks and the implications of risks in the SES it
is vital to combine models that represents the cyber physical properties
of the system as well as interdependent systems. Physical world model,
control and instrumental model and any adversary or failure models, all
need be studied and investigated in parallel to accurately represent the
SES state when facing cyber risks. Interestingly it seemed that industries
participants are very familiar and prone to failures and risks in their sys-
tems. They are usually expecting physical and natural failures in their
systems on regular a bases and not surprisingly planning well ahead in
how to react/recover and what do if that happens. However they have
pointed it out that their main challenge with the new failures is, decid-
ing whether a system failure is the result of cyber attack or its is one of
the known causes already known by the industry. As an ongoing system
monitoring and normal activity, they observe the power outages, systems
destructions on their underlying systems on a daily bases. However to
decide whether a fuse tripping in a cyber enable component is a physical
or random failure or perhaps a consequence of a cyber-attack seem to be
a challenging task from the industry point of view. Based on the smart
grid architecture, it was argued that any risks or cyber threats could influ-
ence and jeopardise any layers identified in smart grid architecture model
(SGAM). Each layer has different and diverse purposes and cyber-attack
could influence the system at any of the levels with serious implications.
For instance a cyber risk could target a business layer, component layer or
communication layer. This means that there is a greater need for models
that can include all of the layers in SGAM to enable us in identifying and
tracing risks. Also it was pointed out in the discussions that such models
might be very complex and in some points, not feasible to build because
of the complexity, heterogeneity and interrelationships among all the lay-
ers of SGAM. Although based on another discussion some argue for using
hazard and operability (HAZOP) as a known methods for evaluating the
security of energy systems, since the method is used widely in the safety
critical systems. However it was clarified that HAZOP is not able to pro-
vide enough insight for a complex, very large and interdependent system
such as smart energy systems and instead suggested hybrid models that
can capture emerging properties.
C.2 Current Approaches Session
In terms of what is out there to tackle cyber security in the energy systems,
number of tools and solutions have been mentioned. Mobius developed
by Illinois is one of the tools that is gaining high reputations for it is
use in modelling the security of energy systems. Mobius could be used
to test some adversary models on any given energy systems. The system
analysts can design the adversary model with having some goals in mind
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and perform simulation analysis of the system to see the likelihoods of
security breaches in the system. It was claimed that the newer version
of the tool is able to ease the process of system integrating and systems
design in Mobius by enabling the tool to simplify the complicated tasks
and still able to achieve similar results. Although it could be argued
that given how powerful Mobius is, its focus is more on to advisory and
informing the security analysts and it is not intended for everyone’s use.
Another interesting discussion of this session was (a talk given by Sara)
about the security of the energy systems but from the user’s prospective.
She has highlighted some interesting points about the role of people in the
smart energy systems and the lack of research into the human behaviour
in the field. The argument was mainly based on the human perceptions
and how they might use the technology for their own gains rather that
the intended design principles. People are going to use technology the
way they prefer and therefore they should be included in the way we
analyse smart energy systems and incorporate the human behaviour into
the design and analysis.
14
